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US climate politics in the Trump era: Options for EU 
engagement  
Bram De Botselier 
United States (US) President Trump’s announcement to 
withdraw his country from the Paris Agreement left policy-
makers and academics wondering about the impact of this 
decision on global climate governance. Some feared that the 
decision would paralyze the 23rd Conference of the Parties 
(COP 23) to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). However, there were no signs at 
the summit that the US would obstruct the multilateral 
climate process. While the official delegation largely 
ignored the multilateral process, an unofficial shadow 
delegation, the so-called US Climate Action Center, made 
clear that many in the US are still planning to live up to the 
Paris commitments. This prompted calls on the European 
Union (EU) to engage with these representatives from US 
states in order to protect the ‘Paris spirit’. One possible area 
of cooperation concerned the link between the EU’s carbon 
market and a similar scheme in California.  
These calls for cooperation however largely ignore the fact 
that the US pro-Paris movement in Bonn almost exclusively 
consisted of members of the liberal wing of the Democratic 
Party, with former New York City Mayor Bloomberg and 
former California Governor Schwarzenegger being the 
exceptions that confirm the rule. As a result, conservative 
Democrats as well as almost the entire Republican Party 
seem to be off the EU’s radars. This is rather problematic 
considering that there are only eight Democratic ‘trifectas’, 
that is, states where the executive and legislative branches 
are controlled by the Democratic Party. So far, the EU has 
thus only engaged with a small minority of the US political 
spectrum.  
This policy brief argues that, if the EU wishes to show 
leadership and protect the Paris spirit, it needs to encourage 
US domestic climate action and ensure the US remains 
involved in global climate governance in the medium term. 
To do so, it must also engage with other partners than the 
liberal, pro-climate Democrats, including conservative 
Democrats and moderate Republicans.  
EU options to engage with US state-level climate policies 
State-driven US climate policies: about blue, red and purple 
states 
The US Climate Action Center at COP 23 offered an easy way 
out of the question on what would happen to international 
climate negotiations following President Trump’s decision to 
withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement. “We will 
continue to engage with the US administration, but also reach 
out to state and local actors in the US”, was the answer. It 
was enabled by the presence of the shadow delegation under 
California Governor Brown and former New York City Mayor 
Bloomberg. And the EU indeed engaged with this unofficial 
Executive Summary 
> US President Trump’s announcement to withdraw 
his country from the Paris Agreement has 
complicated global climate governance. 
> If the EU wants to keep the US engaged in climate 
politics at both the national and multilateral 
levels, it has several options: 
> The EU and its member states can cooperate 
bilaterally with US state-level actors. This 
presupposes, however, an engagement with 
more difficult conversation partners than 
Democrats from liberal, coastal states. 
> The EU can engage with members of Congress 
from the entire political spectrum, focussing 
on moderate Republicans and conservative 
Democrats. 
> By sharing information and technical expertise, 
the EU can help domestic climate initiatives 
develop and keep the discussion on climate 
change on the national agenda in the US. 
> These efforts focusing on domestic US political 
action are in turn likely to result in US re-
engagement in multilateral negotiations. 
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US delegation, for example inviting Governor Brown for an 
event on clean energy in the European Parliament (EP). 
However, the delegation of US Governors at COP 23 only 
consisted of Democrats: apart from J. Brown (California), 
these were K. Brown (Oregon), McAuliffe (Virginia) and Inslee 
(Washington). The same goes for the Congressional 
delegation, with Senators Schatz (Hawaii), Cardin (Maryland), 
Markey (Massachusetts), Merkley (Oregon), and Whitehouse 
(Rhode Island). All of these are politicians from coastal ‘blue’ 
states, where Democrats have a high chance of winning 
(federal) elections. With the exception of Virginia, these 
states are amongst the most liberal ones in the US. 
The same is true for the US Climate Alliance, a coalition of 15 
states that pledged to respect the commitments made under 
the Paris Agreement. Out of those 15 states, 14 voted 
Democratic in at least three out of the four last presidential 
elections. The coalition again mainly consists of liberal, 
coastal states. While research has indeed shown that state-
driven (sub-national) climate policies can be very effective in 
reducing CO2 emissions (Martin & Saikawa 2017), for these 
efforts to be somewhat compensating for the lack of progress 
on the US federal level, more states will have to be involved. 
This means that ‘non-obvious’ states should not be forgotten, 
especially moderate, ‘purple’ states that are not dominated 
by either party, and even red, Republican states. 
By also engaging in discussions with these actors, the EU 
avoids contributing to the further polarisation of the climate 
debates in the US. Indeed, early environmental legislation 
received bipartisan support, and Republican Presidents 
Eisenhower and Bush senior were instrumental in some key 
pieces of legislation regarding acid rain and air pollution. This 
has significantly changed today. Climate change legislation 
has become a partisan issue, pushed by some Democrats but 
largely ignored by the Republicans. 
Inspiration on how so-called purple and red states might be 
approached can be found by looking at the only Republican-
leaning state in the US Climate Alliance, namely North 
Carolina. North Carolina can hardly be called a liberal state. 
The state voted for Trump over Clinton by 3.6 percentage 
points – favouring Trump by 5.7 percentage points compared 
to the national average. Its legislature is heavily dominated 
by the Republican Party and the Democratic Governor was 
elected after a very close race against an unpopular 
Republican incumbent. Nevertheless, both parties in North 
Carolina are convinced of the need for policy measures in 
support of renewable energy and have created a legislative 
framework that supports renewable energy. For instance, a 
new law, adopted with bipartisan support, enables customers 
to lease instead of buy solar panels, making them financially 
more accessible. It is estimated that these measures will 
result in an increase of North Carolina’s solar power 
production by 2.6 Gigawatts, reinforcing its position as the 
second biggest producer of solar energy in the US. This is not 
to say that the law was approved without problems, to the 
contrary. There is also no evidence that the state’s local 
politicians are more aware of the risks of climate change. For 
North Carolina, solar energy production is simply considered 
as beneficial for businesses and for its energy independence 
(Eckhouse & Chediak 2017). 
This example of implementing climate-friendly measures 
because they are ‘good for business’ can be used across the 
US. What is needed is information-sharing and legislative 
support, considering that state legislators do not always 
possess the necessary resources to perform research on their 
own. Sharing legislative experiences and adopting measures 
that have proven successful in other regions can be very 
effective, as evidenced by the efforts of the conservative 
platform American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). ALEC 
provides a platform for legislators, lobbyists and interest 
groups to exchange ideas that can serve as the basis for 
legislation. This practice has proven effective, with ALEC 
being responsible for key conservative accomplishments 
(McIntire 2012). ALEC, being a conservative platform, does 
not promote climate change initiatives. Nevertheless, its 
strategy can be used to develop an alternative legislative 
exchange council that would share information regarding 
climate policy. 
How the EU and its members can engage with state-level 
actors in the US 
For the EU and its member states to engage with actors at the 
state level in the US, emphasis could first of all be placed on 
those states that have expressed disappointment with 
President Trump’s decision to leave the Paris Agreement 
while stopping short of adopting concrete state-level 
measures as a compensation. These include some major 
emitters such as Illinois, Ohio and Pennsylvania as well as 
various smaller states like Maryland, Montana and New 
Mexico. Ohio and Pennsylvania are purple ‘swing states’, 
where there is no clear majority for either party. The others 
are states where the Governor belongs to what is normally 
the minority party in that state, such as Republican Governor 
Rauner in blue Illinois and Democratic Governor Bullock in 
red Montana (Storrow & Holden 2017). While these state 
leaders are aware of the dangers of climate change, they 
need some more convincing regarding the economic impact 
of ‘green’ measures – concerns that are shared by many 
European leaders. The EU is sometimes also accused of failing 
to back up its ambitious rhetoric with concrete internal policy 
initiatives. Several EU member states are lagging behind in 
their efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to 
increase renewable energy, such as Belgium, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands. Conversely, other member 
states are doing relatively well when it comes to these 
criteria. Sweden has for example invested in increasing the 
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share of public transportation that uses renewable energy 
(EEA 2017). The abovementioned US states may be highly 
interested to learn about some of these concrete policy 
initiatives, and how they could be worked out in practice, and 
the ‘green’ EU member states will most likely be willing to 
share their best practices. What is currently lacking, is a 
platform for these exchanges. The 2018 climate summit in 
San Francisco, organised by the California state government, 
offers an opportunity to do this at a high political level, 
considering that the summit is aimed at engaging state, 
regional and city actors. More technical expertise could be 
shared by experts in the margins of the summit. It could be 
worth considering to organise similar summits in the future, 
which would complement the UNFCCC COP process that is 
still dominated by nation-states. 
This same strategy can also be used for states with a history 
of climate measures, but where a Republican ‘trifectas’ has 
brought these efforts to a halt, such as Arizona, Florida, 
Michigan and New Hampshire. It seems unlikely that any 
progress in climate policy will be made in the short term, 
considering the fact that the Governors in these states have 
already expressed their – sometimes implicit – support for 
Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Nevertheless, 
these are states with a significant presence of pro-climate 
groups, activists and politicians, as evidenced by the climate 
legislation that has been adopted in the past. There is no 
reason to think that these groups have suddenly disappeared, 
they are simply not in power at this moment. It is therefore 
important to keep engaging with policy-makers in these areas 
as well, in order for climate change to remain on the public 
agenda and for the pro-climate coalitions to become stronger 
again in the longer term. 
Additionally, regional climate initiatives such as carbon 
trading systems like the California-driven Western Climate 
Initiative (WCI) and the Northeastern Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI) can certainly benefit from the EU’s 
experience. While both of these initiatives started with many 
good intentions, they are currently experiencing difficulties. 
Within the WCI, only California has implemented the 
required carbon emissions trading scheme. The other US 
states, even the liberal ones, decided to withdraw from the 
agreement when the economic costs were considered to be 
too high. The RGGI is also experiencing difficulties, with New 
Hampshire for example looking for ways to leave. Based on 
its own experience with the Emissions Trading System (ETS), 
the EU could be a prime source of information and inspiration 
on how these regional initiatives might be re-energized.  
The EU is already quite active when it comes to public 
diplomacy in the US, both through the EU Delegation and 
member states’ embassies. For example, the EU Delegation’s 
Twitter and Facebook accounts regularly mention climate 
change and the Delegation actively participates in high-level 
summits and seminars on climate, as evidenced by the EU 
Ambassador’s participation in the first North American 
Climate Summit in Chicago in December 2017. This event 
provided a high-level platform for several dozen mayors to 
exchange views on environmental policy.  
Moreover, the EU should also aim to share concrete, 
technical expertise, for example with the carbon trading 
initiatives mentioned above. The lead actor for this would be 
the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Climate 
Action (DG CLIMA), which has the required expertise and was 
the powerbroker of the reforms to the EU’s own carbon 
trading system. Concretely, DG CLIMA could participate in the 
meetings that are regularly held by the states participating in 
these regional initiatives. During these meetings, 
representatives from each state’s Environment Department 
discuss progress and potential reforms, making DG CLIMA’s 
expertise particularly relevant. Such efforts can be 
complemented by facilitating contacts between EU 
legislators with specific expertise, such as the European 
Parliament’s rapporteur on ETS or members of the EP 
delegation to the US that are also part of the EP’s 
environment committee (ENVI), and US state legislators. 
The EU could even go further in sharing its experience by also 
engaging with very conservative states. Coal-mining states 
like Kentucky, West Virginia and Wyoming fear the social and 
economic consequences of closing their mines, even though 
their continued operation is not economically viable (Mufson 
2017). These are concerns that are shared in EU member 
states like Germany and Poland. It is no coincidence that 
Poland will host the next UN climate summit in Katowice, in 
the heart of a coal-mining region. It is arguably not a bad thing 
that this will result in increased attention for those regions 
and countries where coal is still an important part of the 
energy mix, as long as discussions are focused on the 
technological and financial aid needed to achieve the 
transition to renewable energy. This would then definitely 
result in a valuable precedent that the Polish government 
could share with US states facing similar challenges.  
Engaging with all these actors will require more and different 
sorts of efforts than simply interacting with Democratic 
policy-makers from liberal, coastal states. It will require 
reaching out to a broader range of states to ensure progress 
in US domestic climate politics. Indeed, it is relatively easy to 
convince a vegetarian that eating meat is not good for the 
environment. However, persuading convinced meat fans of 
this fact is much harder, even though their collective 
contribution to a more limited meat consumption would be 
more significant in the fight against climate change. 
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EU options to engage with US federal-level climate policies 
Identifying partners at the federal level 
It seems obvious that little progress on climate policies will 
be made at the US federal level, at least in the short term. The 
announced US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the 
nomination of climate sceptic Pruitt as Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency as well as statements by 
President Trump himself, have made that very clear. It is also 
evident that climate change is not an issue like US sanctions 
against Russia, where Congress would act in a unified manner 
to impose its own view on the administration, against the 
wishes of President Trump. Nevertheless, it is important to 
continue to engage with actors at the federal level as well, in 
order to at the very least block anti-climate legislation, as well 
as to ensure that the US becomes again involved in global 
climate governance in the medium term. 
While it has become commonplace to associate every 
Republican with climate denial, the reality is more complex. 
Not each Republican party member associates himself or 
herself with Senate Environment Committee Chairman 
Inhofe (Oklahoma) who called climate change a ‘hoax’. Ahead 
of the 2015 Paris Climate Summit (COP 21), the Senators had 
to voice their opinion on a series of amendments on climate 
change. All but one Senator stated that climate change is real, 
59 voted in favour of a statement saying that human activity 
contributes to climate change, and 50 Senators judged that 
human activity significantly contributes to climate change. All 
Democrats were in favour of these motions, and so were 
several Republicans. Key Senators in this group are 
Murkowski (Alaska), Flake and McCain (Arizona), Collins 
(Maine), Heller (Nevada), Portman (Ohio), Toomey 
(Pennsylvania), Graham (South Carolina), Alexander and 
Corker (Tennessee) and Hatch (Utah). In addition to these, a 
group of conservative Democrats is often overlooked as well, 
namely Senators Donnelly (Indiana), Tester (Montana), 
McCaskill (Missouri), Heitkamp (North Dakota) and Manchin 
(West Virginia) – as well as, possibly, Jones (Alabama).  
This group of conservative Democrats and moderate 
Republicans agrees that climate change is a real threat driven 
by human activity, but is still susceptible to short-term 
economic benefits brought about by climate-unfriendly 
initiatives like the Keystone XL pipeline or oil drilling in the 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. If the EU wants to have a real 
influence in the US Congress,  it has to engage with this group 
of Senators. Although they may be somewhat more difficult 
conversation partners, US (anti-)climate legislation 
nevertheless depends on their swing votes. 
The same goes for the House of Representatives, where 
possible partners in the fight against climate change can 
however be identified more easily. Some moderates have 
united in the bipartisan Climate Solutions Caucus, which aims 
to promote economically viable climate measures within the 
chamber. This group consists of an equal number of 
Republicans and Democrats and, together with the above-
mentioned group in the Senate, can be important to make 
sure that climate change continues to receive attention at the 
federal level. This can be done by organizing Congressional 
hearings and other public events, proposing (non-)binding 
legislation, and by ensuring the issue remains important 
during electoral campaigns. While the group is too small to 
advance federal climate policy by itself, it has already proven 
to have a real impact on legislation by being key in the defeat 
of some anti-climate measures, such as anti-climate 
amendments to the bill financing the Defence Department.  
How the EU and its members can engage with actors at the 
federal level  
A good interlocutor for these federal lawmakers would be the 
EP, which has a long-standing involvement in the UNFCCC 
process. Since the Lisbon Treaty, it has to approve EU-level 
multilateral environmental agreements, such as the Paris 
Agreement. But even before 2009, the EP already tried to 
influence EU and third country negotiators by organizing 
parliamentary hearings, adopting non-binding resolutions, 
sending delegations to global climate summits and promoting 
climate legislation through interparliamentary contacts. In 
addition to that, the EP is also involved in the making of 
internal EU climate policies. All these factors combined have 
allowed it to build up a rather extensive expertise in the area 
(Biedenkopf 2015). 
Much of this expertise would also be very relevant for 
Members of Congress, because they operate in similar 
multilevel systems of governance. Legislators on both sides 
are directly elected in a process that is heavily dominated by 
political parties. This results in legislators having a ‘double 
hat’, namely member of their party, but also representative 
of a specific (member) state or district. As such, they have to 
continuously balance between commitments to their 
national party (or EU-level party), their local party as well as 
their own constituents. Moreover, there is a disconnect 
between the legislative and the executive branch in both the 
EU and the US political systems. The US President is directly 
elected, the members of the European Commission as well as 
the President of the European Council are nominated by the 
member states. In both systems, the designation of the 
executive operates thus separately from the election of the 
legislature, meaning that the executive does not necessarily 
have a majority in the legislature. This complicates decision-
making somewhat, particularly in cases of ‘divided 
government’. Conversely, it can also allow for broader public 
debate and it provides more opportunities for individual 
legislators to play a key role in law-making, particularly at the 
level of (sub-)committees, as they are somewhat less 
constrained by party discipline. 
5 
 
Theorising the ENP – Conference Report 
© Author name 
CEPOB # 1.15 December 2015 
US climate politics in the Trump era: Options for EU engagement 
© Bram De Botselier 
CEPOB # 1.18 - January 2018 
 
In order to share its legislative experience on climate change, 
the EP can make use of the already existing mechanisms, such 
as its delegation to the US, which is the oldest and largest of 
all EP delegations. This EP delegation comes together with 
representatives from the US Congress in the Transatlantic 
Legislators’ Dialogue for high-level discussions. Moreover, 
this Dialogue also allows for a continuous and structural 
communication at staff-level (Jančić 2015). Furthermore, 
with the establishment of the EP Liaison Office in 
Washington, DC, the EP has a permanent representation for 
its relations with the US Congress. The EP can easily use these 
existing mechanisms to increase its engagement with 
Members of Congress on climate issues and to specifically 
target the key players that were identified earlier, developing 
a genuine ‘parliamentary climate diplomacy’. 
Conclusion 
President Trump has undoubtedly dealt a major blow to 
global climate governance with his intent to withdraw a 
major greenhouse gas emitter from the Paris Agreement. 
Nevertheless, this policy brief shows that there are numerous 
possibilities to engage with US political actors other than the 
current administration. This could lead to further progress at 
the state level even in the short term, but is also important in 
order for climate change to remain on the public agenda and 
for the US to re-engage in multilateral climate action in the 
medium term. The EU can offer its support by sharing 
expertise and information. This would allow for the climate 
debate to continue, while preventing it from being hijacked 
by vocal climate sceptics.  
To really protect the spirit of the Paris Agreement, EU 
engagement with the US cannot simply focus on Democrats 
from liberal, coastal states, however. A comprehensive 
strategy also needs to target moderate Republican and 
conservative Democratic lawmakers and states. This policy 
brief identified some potential interlocutors for the EU and 
discussed which EU actor(s) would be best suited to engage 
with these (sub)national US actors.  
If such forms of engagement were to be reinforced, President 
Trump’s decision on the Paris Agreement could actually offer 
an opportunity for the EU to demonstrate its environmental 
leadership not only on the international stage, but also by 
influencing domestic US climate policies.
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